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IN RE M.J.J., J.P.L., & J.P.G: THE "QUALIFIED EXPERT




The 2003 Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decision In re M.J, J.P.L., &
J.P.G.' is one of the more recent Oklahoma Appellate decisions to apply the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).2 M.J.J. construed amongst other provisions
the provisions of the act that require testimony of a "qualified expert witness"
in support of trial court orders placing children covered by the act3 in foster
care4 or orders terminating the parental rights5 of a parent of a child covered by
the act. While in many respects the MJ.J. decision was unremarkable in itself,
the reasoning employed by the court (drawn from earlier mandatory Oklahoma
authority6) gives pause for concern. State court judges have at times
undermined ICWA through the use of creative interpretive devices that avoid
strict application of the Act in some situations.7 The specific device involved
in MJJ was the "qualified expert witness" requirement in deprived child
termination of parental rights proceedings under ICWA.
MJ.J. will be examined through the prism of the most recent Oklahoma
Supreme Court decisions construing ICWA's qualified expert witness
requirement. The paper will argue that Oklahoma's ICWA jurisprudence in
this area is out of step with the purposes of the expert testimony requirements
of the act. This note will examine the reasoning and logic of M.J.J., place the
I. Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
I. In re M.J.L., 69 P.3d 1226 (Okla. Ct. App. 2003).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
3. The Act applies to all "child custody proceeding[s] involving an Indian child." Id. §
1911.
4. Id. § 1912(e).
5. Id. § 1912(o.
6. Intermediate appellate decisions from Oklahoma's Court of Civil Appeals (the COCA)
are not binding on other courts but instead control only to the extent they are persuasive;
Oklahoma trial courts need not adhere to the rules announced by COCA unless "ordered for
publication" by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 30.5 (2001).
7. See. e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587 (2002).
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case within the context of established Oklahoma law, and then argue that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court missed an opportunity to provide the clarity that
Congress itself failed to articulate in ICWA and indeed undermined the very
purpose of the Act. Finally, the note will take a look at Minnesota's approach
to the expert witness requirement and argue that Minnesota comes closer to
fulfilling the mandate of ICWA.
II. The Indian Child Welfare Act
A. History
Recognizing "no resource.., more vital to the continued existence.., of
Indian tribes than their children,"8 In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child
Welfare Act.9
ICWA was a response to congressional concern that Native-American
culture was under a systematic assault from an Anglo-centric state court
culture that seemed to think removal of Indian children from their native
culture was, defacto, "in the best interest" of any child before the court. 10
This Anglo "cultural bias" often that has propelled state judges in custody
proceedings involving Indians to remove children from their Indian family
based on Anglo notions of neglect that are in many cases out of step with
Indian cultural norms." The concern addressed by ICWA is that, as a result
of this Anglo bias, courts find children "deprived" where the child is raised in
a manner acceptable to tribal custom, but to the Anglo eye appears contrary to
the welfare of the child.12
Specifically noted by Congress was the common example of an Indian child
left in the care of relatives, such as a grandparent or a great-aunt, or even
friends or neighbors, for an extended period. 3 To many state courts this
8. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2000) (Congressional Findings).
9. See supra note 2.
10. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., at 8-11 (1978). It is axiomatic in family law
jurisprudence that the "best interest of the child" is the ultimate guide for judicial action in child
custody matters. See, e.g., Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges'
Accounts of the Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW & Soc'y REv. 769 (2004). But see Christine
Metleer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 419, 442-44 (1998) (noting best interest of child is inappropriate
consideration in ICWA jurisdictional determinations).
11. See, e.g., Ester C. Kim, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The
Contemplation ofAll, the Best Interests of None, 43 RuTGERS L. REv. 761, 765-66 (1991).
12. Id.




indicated neglect; the result, placement of the child in foster care, or, in the
extreme case, termination of parental rights.14
In many Indian cultures, however, the child is not considered child of the
parent alone, but rather child of the clan or tribe itself.15 Not only is it thus
proper for the child to be cared for by her extended family; it is considered
healthy.' 6 Blind application of the Anglo standard results in a child being
unnecessarily removed from its family, clan, and tribe, further reducing the
tribe's human capital.17 State judges, unwilling or incapable of recognizing the
phenomenon, thus contributed to the breakdown of Indian society. 8
Whatever one might say of the motivation behind the decisions of state court
judges, the impact of this cultural bias was the removal and separation of
Indian children from their families at rates far in excess of children of Anglo
heritage. 9 As one perceptive Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice put it,
speaking in dissent in an ICWA case, "the majority, exercising traditional
Anglo-Saxon notions of child custody proceedings, has failed completely to
recognize essential tribal relations, and the right which Native Americans
possess to preserve their identity as a people."2
Another problem, also noted by Congress, concerns allegations of neglect
or abuse stemming from a parent's use of alcohol.2' Here cultural bias may
play an unseen but unfortunate role. It is argued that allegations of alcohol use
unlikely to result in termination or foster placement of Anglo children are more
likely to support termination in cases involving Indian children. Congress'
14. See id. at 765 n.28; see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37; In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059,
1072 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1075-76 (Kauger, J., dissenting).
17. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 8-11.
18. See, Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000) (Congressional Findings).
19. Surveys conducted in 1969 and then in 1974 indicated that approximately twenty-five
to thirty-five percent of American Indian children were placed in foster or adoptive homes and
that nearly one in four Indian infants under one year of age was adopted. Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d
at 1072 (Kauger, J. dissenting) (citing Gaylene J. McCartney, The American Indian Child
Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide orFirstAmendmentPreservation, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REv. 529 (1975)).
20. Id.
21. See Kim, supra note 11, at 765-66 (arguing that the most frequent ground for removal
of Indian children is alcohol use, but similar usage rates amongst whites results in removal far
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approach to reversing this blind application of Anglo cultural standards in
Indian child custody proceedings is discussed below.
B. Purpose and Provisions of ICWA
The Act itself declares Congress' intent, to "protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families. 23 ICWA was Congress' attempt to reverse the "wholesale separation
of Indian Children from their families" by restoring tribal authority over Indian
child custody proceedings.24 The thrust of ICWA is to place limitations on the
exercise of unbridled discretion of state court judges in cases involving Indian
children.25
Several methods are employed by ICWA; among the most significant: (1)
tribal authorities are given priority in exercising jurisdiction over "Indian Child
Custody Proceedings; '26 (2) ICWA commands the states (and the United
States, its territories, and other Indian tribes) to give full faith and credit to
tribal authorities' proceedings; 27  (3) ICWA establishes "placement
preferences" to be followed in determining foster placement and adoption of
Indian children;28 (4) it establishes procedural guidelines29 for Indian child
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000). The section states:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children
in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture,
and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and
family service programs.
Id.
24. Atwood, supra note 7, at 587-88.
25. See Joseph v. Twomey, Considering a Native American Child's Need for Permanent
Placement Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: In re S.E.G, A.L.W., & V.M.G., 521 N.W.2d
357 (Minn. 1994), 18 HAMuNE L. REv. 281, 289-90 (1994).
26. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000). The section grants the tribe exclusive jurisdiction over
child custody determinations of Indian children residing in or domiciled within the reservation
, (b) requires state courts to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal authorities in any proceeding for
foster care placement or parental rights terminations involving Indian children not domiciled
within the reservation, (c) grants the tribes, and any "Indian custodian of the child" the right to
intervene "at any point" in any state court proceeding for the foster care placement or
termination of parental rights of an Indian child. Id.
27. Id. § 1911(d).
28. Id. § 1915(a) (listing adoptive preference in the following order of preference: (1) a
member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of Indian child's tribe; (3) other
Indian families); id. § 1915(b) (determining foster placement, in the absence of good cause to
[Vol. 29
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/8
custody proceedings, including a requirement that notice be given to both the
parents and the tribe of any pending action;3" (5) it mandates appointment of
counsel to indigents affected by the act;3" (6) it requires that a party seeking to
effect the foster care placement or adoption of an Indian child show attempts
were made to "provide remedial services and rehabilitation programs" to help
prevent breaking up the Indian family;32 and, (7) finally, ICWA requires that
any court order placing an Indian child in foster care33 or terminating the rights
of an Indian child's parents,34 be supported by sufficient evidence including
testimony of "qualified expert witnesses."35
It is the last requirement of ICWA, that proceedings be supported by the
testimony of a qualified expert witness, that is the focus of this paper.
C. The Qualified Expert Witness Requirement
The "qualified expert witness" is not defined in ICWA; thus it is up to the
state courts to define the term on their own. This matter has generated
substantial litigation and divergent interpretations in various state courts.36 As
with most debates, there are two extremes as well as a third option falling
somewhere between those extremes.37
1. "Indian" Expert Witness?
At one extreme are cases that seem to say the phrase "qualified expert
witness" conveys a requirement that the expert, or at least one expert, in every
vary, in the following order of preference: (1) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(2) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's tribe; (3) an Indian foster
home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; (4) an institution
for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization "which has a
program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs").
29. Procedural provisions that often have substantive effect where they rise to a due process
concern. See, e.g., In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 872-73 (Okla. 1988) (Opala, J., dissenting).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2000).
31. Id. § 1912(b).
32. Id. § 1912(d).
33. Id. § 1912(e).
34. Id. § 1912(f).
35. By "clear and convincing evidence" in the case of foster care placement orders, id. §
1912(e), and "beyond reasonable doubt" in termination proceedings, id. § 1912(f).
36. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 41-44, 70-82 and accompanying text; see also Michael C. Snyder, An
Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 815, 834 (1995) (citing cases
from which the three approaches may be discerned).
NOTESNo. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
case, be someone qualified in "Indian cultural affairs. 3 8 This camp seems to
read "qualified" as "Indian" and sees a requirement of the testimony of an
"Indian" expert witness.39 Of course, the "fly in the ointment" with this
approach is that Congress did not use the word "Indian" in the statute. If an
Indian witness was intended by ICWA, Congress could have required an
"Indian expert witness" rather than simply a "qualified expert witness."
2. Any "Expert" Witness?
At the opposite extreme are cases that seem to imply that the language
chosen by the drafters of ICWA connotes no special requirement relating to
"Indian-ness" and that any expert on child rearing or custody issues may be
"qualified."4  Cases adopting this position find that all that is required by
ICWA is that the proceedings include the expert testimony of some
professional witnesses with experience in assessing the needs of the child, and
the ability of the parent to fulfill those needs.4
While the "any expert witness" approach does make some sense, arguing
solely from the text, it ignores the underlying purposes of the Act.42
3. The Middle Ground: The Cultural Bias Standard
The middle approach reserves the requirement of an "Indian" expert witness
only for those cases in which "cultural bias" is "implicated" by the particular
issues raised in the determination before the court. 43 This approach recognizes
that ICWA may always mandate "expert" testimony, but presumes that ICWA
only mandates "Indian" testimony when Indian cultural values are at issue in
the particular action.44 The problem with this view lies not so much in its
theoretical underpinning but in its application. The state judge may not be the
38. See, e.g., In re the Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1990); In re D.S.P., 480
N.W.2d 234 (Wis. 1992); In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17 (Iowa 1990); In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d
572 (Ind. 1991).
39. See, e.g., .B.W. 454 N.W.2d at437.
40. See, e.g., In reC.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1992); In reC.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb.
1992); Rachelle S v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 958 P.2d 459 (Ariz. 1998); In re M.S., 624
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 2001); In re Michael M., 2002 WL 31832560 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2002);
Burks v. Ark. Dep't of Human Serv., 61 S.W.3d 184 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
41. See, e.g., In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1992).
42. See infra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., In reN.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988); L.G.v. Dep't of Health& Soc. Servs.,
14 P.3d 946 (Ala. 2000); In re Michael V., No. A093487, 2001 WL 1337880 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.,
Oct. 31, 2001); In re Baby Boy Doe, 902 P.2d 477 (Idaho 1995).




best person to determine if cultural bias is likely to distort the court's decision.
Indeed the state judges' cultural bias is at the heart of the problems addressed
by ICWA.45 It may be that "Indian" expert testimony is required to answer the
bias question as a threshold matter.46 The middle ground approach will be
discussed at length below, as this is the approach adopted by Oklahoma.
4. BIA Guidelines: Compounding Confusion
As noted, Congress did not define the phrase "qualified expert witness."
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), however, has issued "non-binding"
guidelines for state courts to use in qualifying a witness under the Act.47 The
guidelines first describe the purpose of the qualified expert testimony:
[r]emoval of an Indian child from his or her family must be based
on competent testimony from one or more experts qualified to
speak specifically to the issue of whether continued custody by the
parents or Indian custodians is likely to result in serious physical or
emotional damage to the child.4 8
According to the BIA, there are three "characteristics ... most likely to meet
the requirements for a qualified expert witness" under the Act:
49
(i) A member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by the
tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain
to family organization and childrearing practices.
(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the
delivery of child and family services to Indians, and extensive
knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and
childrearing practices within the Indian child's tribe.
(iii) A professional person having substantial education and
experience in the area of his or her specialty.5
The purpose of ICWA, as stated by Congress, would be best served by an
"Indian expert witness."51 Indeed, the first two BIA "characteristics" seem to
45. See supra note 40.
46. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text; see infra notes 70-82 and
accompanying text.
47. 44 Fed. Reg. 67, 584 (1979).
48. Id. (D.4 Qualified Expert Witnesses).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. This is the view of those courts that always require "Indian" witness testimony in these
hearings. See supra note 36.
No. 2]
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indicate a preference for experts with specialized knowledge of Indian affairs
and culture. The first two BIA Guidelines indicate a preference for "Indian"
expert testimony. However, the BIA did include the third characteristic.
Further, the three are listed disjunctively; thus, if satisfaction of the third
characteristic, "a professional person" alone suffices, the BIA guidelines,
applied literally, require no cultural sensitivity in Indian child foster placement
or termination proceedings. This seems to contradict the purpose of ICWA and
effectively render the first two expert "characteristics" superfluous. 2 If the
third "characteristic" alone suffices to qualify all experts for ICWA purposes,
the BIA may have created an "exception" that swallows any "rule" indicated
by the first two characteristics. Indeed, the commentary to the BIA Guidelines
notes: "The second subsection makes clear that knowledge of tribal culture and
child rearing practices will frequently be very valuable to the court"53; hardly
a mandate for Indian expertise in every case. This is unfortunate.
5. Deducing Congressional Intent
While the ICWA provisions outlining the qualified expert witness do not list
the criteria to be used in qualifying the expert witnesses, Congress' express
findings in ICWA provide substance to the requirement. One of those findings
states that
the States, exercising their recognizedjurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families.
54
The finding points clearly toward a congressional intent to reduce the
number of Indian children removed from their homes based upon cultural bias
that fails to recognize differences between Anglo and Indian cultural norms.
Surely, Congress's findings should set the purpose and overall tenor of the Act;
accordingly, it seems clear the qualified expert witness requirement is aimed
at reducing the likelihood that foster care and parental termination proceedings
are driven by cultural bias.5 If so, perhaps an expert uniquely qualified to
52. It seems likely that most witnesses who qualify under either of the first two BIA
guidelines will also be a "professional person having substantial education in the area of his or
her specialty."
53. 44 Fed. Reg. 67, 584 D.4 commentary (1979) (emphasis added).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000).




determine whether these proceedings have been driven off track by cultural
bias is in order. Perhaps ICWA, according to its stated purpose, does demand
a determination in each case that cultural bias is not implicated in these
proceedings; in which case only an "Indian" expert witness is qualified to
make this initial determination.
III. The Qualified Expert Witness in Oklahoma Jurisprudence
Prior to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decision in M.J.J., the
Oklahoma Supreme Court had itself addressed the qualified expert witness in
at least two opinions. It did so in depth in 1988 with In re N.L.56and in a more
perfunctory manner in 1992 with the deprived child proceeding of In re S.C.
& J C.57 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in S.C. & J.C., with no discussion of
its reasoning, simply determined that the testimony of "case workers" satisfied
the expert witness requirement of ICWA.55 The N.L. case laid the foundation
for Oklahoma's application of the qualified expert witness standard and bears
consideration in depth.
A. In re N.L.
1. Factual Setting
The N.L. case gave the Oklahoma Supreme Court the opportunity to
construe several provisions of ICWA in depth.5 9 N.L. was born out of wedlock
in 1984. Several months after his birth, custody of N.L. was placed
temporarily with his maternal grandmother. The state later filed a petition
alleging that due to his mother's "pattern of leaving [him] in the care of various
neighbors for indefinite periods of time," N.L. was a deprived child.6"
Knowing N.L. to be eligible for membership in both the Kaw and Creek Indian
tribes, the state notified the tribes of the pending proceeding,61 but the tribes
did not intervene in the action.62 The mother, "whereabouts unknown," also
56. See supra note 41.
57. In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992).
58. Id. at 1257.
59. Including the "qualified expert witness" requirement, the "good cause" exception to
ICWA's mandate that jurisdiction be transferred to the tribal court in certain cases, and ICWA's
"placement preferences."
60. Per 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101 (1981).
61. ICWA does not define "Indian" for purposes of determine coverage under the Act.
Once a state knows or has reason to know that the child is eligible for Indian tribal membership,
however, the act's notice requirements are triggered. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2000).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c). The section grants the tribes the right to intervene in any state
No. 2]
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did not attend the hearing and N.L. was adjudicated deprived with custody to
continue with the maternal grandmother.63
Two months later, the court issued another order placing custody
temporarily with the maternal grandmother.' Nearly a year later65 and after
the grandmother had suffered an "incapacitating injury," a "redispositional"
hearing was held at which the mother finally appeared with counsel. By then,
the grandmother had voluntarily placed N.L. with a neighbor family. The trial
court made the placement official, granting the neighbors temporary custody
of N.L. At the hearing, the mother was given three months in which to meet
certain conditions in order to avoid termination of her parental rights.66
Later, however, the original adjudication of "deprived child" was set aside
since the mother had not received adequate notice of the proceeding. Two
days later, an amended petition was filed, again alleging that N.L. was a
deprived child (for the same reasons as alleged in the original petition). The
court issued a new order placing temporary custody with the grandmother's
neighbor.
The mother then filed a petition to transfer the proceedings to the Court of
Indian Offenses.67 The mother's transfer petition was denied;68 N.L. was again
adjudicated deprived69 and made a ward of the court.7"
court proceeding "for the foster care placement of, or termination ofparental rights to, an Indian
child" at any point in the proceeding.
63. The court ordered these actions as well as an investigation by the Oklahoma Department
of Human Services in a single hearing on June 25, 1984. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 865 (Okla.
1988).
64. This order was issued on August 9, 1984.
65. June 17, 1985.
66. The court does not say what those conditions were.
67. In Kay County, Oklahoma.
68. On May 7, 1986. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) provides that upon the petition of either
parent, "in the absence of good cause to the contrary," the trial court "shall transfer such
proceedings to the jurisdiction of the trial court." 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) (2000). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court in N.L. found "good cause" to deny the transfer for two reasons: (1) all parties
(except the mother, a resident of Oklahoma County), witnesses and evidence to the proceedings
were located in the Okmulgee County (in which the state court action was pending) while the
tribal court was in Kay County, and (2) the "best interests of the child" supported a finding of
good cause to deny the transfer request. N.L., 754 P.2d at 869.





The mother appealed the court's orders alleging a host of errors.7
Prominent among them, the mother claimed that the order terminating her
parental rights was not supported by the evidence adduced at trial.
ICWA provides:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.72
Similar testimony is required to support a foster care placement decision
regarding an Indian child (although the finding of damage to the child need
only be by "clear and convincing evidence" in this context).7 3
B. Oklahoma Approach: Adopting the Middle Ground in N.L.?
1. Cultural Bias as the Threshold
In N.L., the Oklahoma Supreme Court seems to have adopted the middle
ground approach to defining ICWA's "qualified expert witness" requirement.
Accordingly, where cultural bias is involved, the court should hear testimony
from "Indian" experts; where cultural bias is not involved, other experts will
suffice.74 Unfortunately, the court put the cart before the horse with the
manner in which it determined cultural bias was not implicated. The decision
71. The N.L. case provides a primer on ICWA jurisprudence in Oklahoma. The case deals
with several ofthe "flashpoints" discussed by Barbara Ann Atwood, see supra note 7, including:
(1) the notice requirements of ICWA and the "affidavit" requirement of the Oklahoma ICWA;
(2) the good cause exception to the motion to transfer under ICWA; (3) the placement
preferences set out in 25 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (and the "good cause" exception to the operation of
those placement preferences), and; (4) ICWA's "qualified expert witness" requirements for
determining foster placement and terminating parental rights. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla.
1988).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)(2000).
73. Id. § 1912(e). Additionally, the Oklahoma version of ICWA, 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.5
(200 1), says "no pre-adjudicatory custody order shall remain in force" for more than thirty days
without a determination by the court and supported by "the testimony of at least one qualified
expert witness," that custody of the child with the parent or (Indian custodian) is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
74. N.L., 754 P.2d at 867-68.
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makes clear if the court itself may make this determination on its own. So,
what rule did the Oklahoma court announce and how did it formulate that rule?
2. Borrowing from Oregon Precedent
The Oklahoma Supreme Court drew from an Oregon intermediate appellate
decision75 in determining its qualified expert witness requirement. First, the
court examined the purpose of qualified expert testimony. It noted
specifically, expert testimony is supposed to "provide the court with
knowledge of the social and cultural aspects of Indian life to diminish the risk
of any cultural bias."76 After citing the BIA guidelines as an aid in qualifying
the expert, the court focused on the third guideline, a "professional person
having substantial education and experience in the area of his or her
specialty."77 The court noted that knowledge of Indian life is not necessary
where the professional person testifies on matters "not implicating cultural
bias."7
In the Oregon case, noted the Oklahoma court, the issue was whether the
mother's mental illness would result in serious emotional harm to the child.
"There was no dispute about that condition or its severity."79 Nor did the
"termination" have anything to do with the "mother's fitness to care for the
child according to the cultural dictates of her tribe."8 Thus, according to the
court, there was no need for culture testimony in the Oregon case.8'
In N.L., while the court noted that expert testimony provides "evidence of
tribal customs as they relate to family practices in raising children,"82 the court
went on to say that where cultural bias is "clearly not implicated, expert
witnesses who do not posses special knowledge of Indian life may provide the
necessary proof that continued custody of the child by the parent will result in
serious emotional or physical harm to the child."83 While this statement is
probably true as far as it goes,8" the case, unfortunately, cut against the purpose
75. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
76. N.L., 754 P.2d at 867. The Oklahoma high court quoted from Tucker, adopting the
reasoning of that court in its entirety.
77. Id.
78. Id.





84. It stands to reason that while an Indian expert should testify as to matters of bias, other




of ICWA; the judge (or in this case, the Justices) makes the determination that
cultural bias is not implicated.
3. Analysis of N.L.: Exception That Swallows the Rule
The Oregon case adopted by the Oklahoma Court may be an instance of the
easy case making bad law.8" It is hard to quibble with the result since the
mother's serious mental illness caused her to neglect her child. However,
applying that standard across the board and allowing the trial court to make the
initial determination whether cultural bias is implicated, negates the purposes
of ICWA. In N.L., the mother's rights were terminated because she left her
child with neighbors for an extended period; thus N.L. presented precisely the
type case that gave rise to congressional concern about the improper imposition
of Anglo cultural bias. 6 The basic premise of ICWA is that the child belongs
to the tribe; thus that it may be proper to leave the child in the care of the
"tribal" family.87 The mother's actions in N.L. may have been within the
norms of Kaw or Creek tradition. There are two ways to make this
determination, allow the trial judge (or the supreme court), unfamiliar with
tribal custom, to decide, or hear testimony from an "Indian" expert witness
who has the knowledge needed to assess whether the mother was acting within
the custom of her tribe, or whether she has simply abandoned the baby. In N.L.
the Court simply declared that the termination "had nothing to do with the
mother's fitness to care for the child according to the cultural dictates of her
tribe."88  The Court ignored the fact that the underlying reason for the
termination was the mother's "abandonment" of the child to her grandmother
and neighbors. By not making clear which is required, N.L. paves the way for
Oklahoma trial courts to make the determination without the assistance of the
"Indian" expert.
The problem with this approach is that it flies in the face of congressional
findings that state court judges are themselves either unable or unwilling to set
aside their own biases to properly determine whether tribal cultural values are
at stake.89 If trial court cultural bias is the problem to be addressed by ICWA,
child's interests.
85. See Metleer, supra note 10 (discussing the hard cases making bad law where state court
judges avoid strict application of ICWA in order to reach a desired result).
86. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 13.
88. N.L., 754 P.2d at 868.
89. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
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determining whether Anglo cultural bias exists should not be left to the sole
discretion of the Anglo judge.
The court in N.L. remanded, telling the trial court to determine not whether
cultural bias was implicated but instead, having declared cultural bias was not
an issue, the Court simply ordered the trial court to qualify a BIA "professional
person" to determine if continued custody by the mother would result in harm
to the child.9". The court provided Oklahoma trial judges with the means to
avoid the act; the trial judge need only declare that cultural bias is not at issue
and continue on without input on tribal cultural considerations. Ironically, it
seems, the BIA guidelines provide the very means to foil ICWA.
D. The Rule of N.L. Applied: In re M.J.J., J.P.L., & JP. G
1. Factual Setting
In this case, referred to herein as MJ.J., the mother of three Chickasaw
children appealed from a trial court ruling terminating her parental rights. In
the trial court, the mother stipulated to allegations of marijuana use and
emotional abuse, and seems to have acknowledged that her boyfriend
physically abused the children. The trial court adjudicated the children
deprived and removed them from the mother's custody. The court then
established a treatment plan designed to "correct the conditions which led to
the adjudication" and return the children to her care.9'
Ten months later the state, contending that the mother had failed to abide by
the treatment plan, moved to terminate her parental rights.92 The mother
waived a jury trial and the court ordered termination.93
2. Application of the "Qualified Expert Testimony" Requirement
During the trial, testimony was offered by a social worker with the
Chickasaw Nation child welfare department. The social worker "was a
member of the Chickasaw Nation and was familiar with that culture." 94 The
substance of the testimony was that the actions leading to the termination,
allegations of "emotional abuse and use of marijuana and other drugs," in no
way implicated Chickasaw Tribal customs.95 The court, citing both N.L. and
90. N.L., 754 P.2d at 868.
91. In re M.J.J., 69 P.3d 1226, 1227 (Okla. Ct. App. 2003).
92. Id. at 1227.
93. Id.





the Oregon decision from which N.L. was derived,96 determined that "there is
no evidence that Mother's deficiencies were in any way associated with the
cultural dictates of her tribe."97  The court held that "in the absence of
implication of cultural bias, the expert testimony may be [sic] a social worker
who possesses expertise beyond the normal social worker qualifications. "98
Another expert, a Department of Human Services worker with the requisite
"expertise beyond that of the normal social worker," but with no particular
"Indian" expertise, provided sufficient testimony concerning the likelihood of
harm to the child.99 The trial court was affirmed.
3. Analysis ofMJ.J.: Error of N.L. Revisited
While it is hard to fault the result in M.J.J, the case may have, as did N.L.,
put the cart before the horse; it allows trial judges to avoid the purpose and
goals of ICWA by "declaring" cultural bias to be non-existent. While the
MJJ. court heard the testimony of the one "Indian" witness that cultural bias
was not at play, the court's holding is more expansive. It does not seem to
require such testimony, indeed at the outset the court noted "there is ... no
absolute requirement that the 'qualified expert witness' . . . be an 'Indian
expert witness."" 0 Ultimately, all that seems to be required by MJ.J, like
N.L., is that the trial court, by whatever means, find an "absence of implication
of cultural bias."' 0 ' Perhaps in Oklahoma, Indian expertise is entirely optional
after all. It seems MJ.J. compounded the error of N.L. Perhaps Oklahoma did
not adopt the middle approach after all, but rather the "no Indian expertise"
model instead.
IV. Reconciling the Expert Witness Requirement with the Purposes of ICWA
The Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly identified the purpose behind
ICWA's qualified expert witness requirement - "to provide the court with
knowledge of the social and cultural aspects of Indian life to diminish the risk
of any cultural bias."'0 2 Perhaps the simplest way to ensure that this purpose
is served is to require that in any case in which ICWA's expert witness
96. "Under the circumstances there, the Court found termination had nothing to do with the
mother's fitness to care for the child according to the cultural dictates of her tribe." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1228-29.
100. Id. at 1228.
101. Id.
102. In reN.L.,754 P.2d 863, 867 (Okla. 1988).
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requirement is triggered, the court require "Indian" testimony at the outset as
to whether cultural bias is an issue in the case. If it is shown that the parties'
Indian cultural heritage does not bear on the specific allegations involved, the
court may proceed with other qualified expert witnesses providing the
necessary quantum of proof. If, however, the Indian expert makes a showing
that cultural norms are implicated, the court should give greater consideration
to those cultural concerns.
It would be a simple matter for Congress, or perhaps the United States
Supreme Court to clarify the qualified expert witness requirement. Given,
however, that congress has not done so in the years since enacting ICWA, and
given that the Supreme Court has decided the substance of ICWA in only one
case, ' 3 for now it is up to the legislatures and courts of the individual states to
clarify the requirement. The Oklahoma high court missed the opportunity with
N.L.; The Minnesota Supreme Court has, on the other hand, determined that
ICWA requires "Indian" expert testimony in all cases.
In 1990, the Minnesota high court reversed an earlier determination that
"Indian" expert testimony was not required. 'O Although the decision was
partially based on state law, 10 5 a Minnesota DHS manual added to the BIA's
third "guideline"'1 6 a requirement that the "professional" have "substantial
knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and child-rearing
practices within the Indian community."'0 7 The Minnesota high court appears
to have determined that all qualified expert witnesses may be Indian
witnesses.'0 8 The court, noting that "[n]on-Indian lawyers, social workers and
judges perceive the necessity of terminating parental rights of Indian citizens
through quite different cultural lenses," recognized that where the expert
witnesses are not "conversant with Indian culture and child-rearing practices,
the problems that Congress has tried to remedy may remain, despite the
adoption of the Indian Child Welfare Act."'0 9 While the Minnesota court may
103. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); see also
Metleer, supra note 10, at 420-24 (discussing Holyfield and congressional attempts to amend
ICWA).
104. In re the Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing In re
Welfare of T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
105. ICWA preempts state law except where state law provides greater protection than does
ICWA, in which case the state law must be applied. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (2000).
106. See supra note 46.
107. B. W., 454 N.W.2d at 442.
108. Id. at 446; see also Lynn Klicker Uthe, The Best Interests of Indian Children in
Minnesota, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 237, 258-60 (1992).
109. B. W., 454 N.W.2d at 444.
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have gone even a bit too far by requiring every expert be versed in Indian
culture,' 10 it at least went in the right direction.
Conclusion
With the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress established procedures to
guide state trial court judges in proceedings to remove Indian children from
their parents. Congress's stated goal was to reverse the trend whereby Anglo
cultural bias was allowed to contaminate the proceedings. Congress hoped to
prevent the unnecessary removal of Indian children from their Indian parents
and tribal associations. However, by failing to define its "qualified expert
witness" requirement, Congress left a gaping hole in ICWA, one through
which state judges, by design or ignorance, may avoid the purposes of ICWA
in foster placement and parental termination proceedings. It is left to the states
to flesh out the expert witness requirement. Unfortunately Oklahoma seems
to have followed the lead of Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
failed to articulate clear guidelines with respect to application of the qualified
expert witness requirement, even undermining the very purpose of ICWA.
This is unfortunate and Oklahoma would be better served had its courts taken
their cue from the Minnesota Supreme Court and mandated expert testimony
concerning whether cultural bias is implicated in every case in which ICWA
applies.
110. Other courts recognize that ICWA only requires a single qualified expert witness. See,
e.g., In re Kreft, 384 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). If this is so, and if Minnesota
indeed requires that where there are multiple witnesses, all be "Indian" experts, the decision
probably goes too far. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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